We will state the appropriate rule from the current SLOCF manual and then, indicated by arrow and italicized copy:

→ What SLO City FD actually did.

     — See also: SFFD Ventilation Manual

The decision to refuse to fight a fire is a huge, serious, and significant decision. Nowhere in any firefighter narratives on this fire is there any discussion or consideration of what they are intending to do and the effects it will have on the business, the employees, the family operating the business, the community downwind who had to eat all the smoke needlessly generated, and the millions of gallons of water wasted. If only Incident Commander BC-1 Neal Berryman or Fire Chief Garret Olson would have considered fighting the fire instead of only considering firefighter well-being at the expense of everyone else and the community, it would have been a small short fire. By refusing to fight the fire when they could and should have, they abandoned their responsibilities to the community and chose only to serve themselves. They not only chose not to do their job, they did worse than nothing - They helped spread the fire. SLO City FD leadership is responsible for most of the destruction in The Sub and all of Square Deal destruction that followed.

SAN LUIS OBISPO CITY FIRE - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANUAL - (EXCERPTS)

SLOCF - E.O. 501.00

INCIDENT COMMAND

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

• "The IC will then establish command and identity/name of an incident, and take an effective command position."

→ The fire was not in view from the command position. BC-1 Berryman failed to take effective command position as he could not see the fire from his command position.

• "The IC shall perform a size-up/risk assessment, determine the incident objectives, and communicate them to all participants."

→ No size-up/risk assessment was done. BC-1 Berryman seemed to have a predetermined agenda stemming from either his own preferences or underground (or unpublished) firefighter policies that SLO City FD is operating with. BC-1 Berryman makes no mention of any actual assessments in his narrative.

→ Failed completely in sizing up the incident. BC-1 Berryman sent firemen onto the roof before even looking at the fire. BC-1 Berryman does not comment anywhere in his narrative on the continuous and ongoing sizing-up of the situation he is supposed to be doing in determining the actions he should be taking.

• "The IC shall be responsible to continually evaluate the progress toward accomplishing incident objectives and/or adjust them as necessary."

→ Actually fighting the fire was never evaluated and the only re-evaluation was how to accelerate progress of burning it down. Nowhere in BC-1 Berryman's narrative does he claim he constantly or repeatedly re-evaluated the fire - Nowhere does he show any concern to actually put water on the fire.

• "The IC shall be responsible for proper organization and documentation of the incident, and to utilize an Incident Action Plan (IAP) to assist in management of the incident."

→ BC-1 Berryman's narrative is totally insufficient and lacking in detail. Very little documentation is done. He does not take initial responsibility nor give reason for the defensive posture from the start. He leaves out completely the firefighting from 1:00pm until 11:00pm. It is as if there was no Square Deal Fire…

→ BC-1 Berryman delayed his narrative four days (to improperly coordinate with others?)

→ Rather than document the incident, BC-1 Berryman and Chief Olson issued fraudulent and false press releases claiming they took action on the interior to fight the fire that they clearly did not do. They claimed (on television) storage and debris in The Sub as a reason to not fight the fire, yet there was no storage or debris in The Sub. Fraud and deception are the opposite of documentation.

COMMAND FUNCTIONS

Size Up

"A proper size-up by the first-arriving officer (IC) is essential. Size-up is a mental process of evaluating the influencing factors at an incident prior [emphasis added] to committing resources to a course of action. It typically involves a 360-degree pass around the incident scene, questioning bystanders, noting hazards, exposures, etc. All decisions, which determine strategy and commitment of resources, shall be based on a deliberate size-up of the situation. A proper size-up will answer these fundamental questions:

1. Where am I?

2. What do I have?

3. Where is it going?

4. What am I going to do, and what will I need to do it?"

→ BC-1 Berryman appears to have arrived with a predetermined decision to not fight the fire. He would allow no firefighter to enter The Sub during the crucial early minutes of the fire or at any subsequent time.

→ BC-1 Berryman makes no notes or comments in his narrative regarding sizing up the fire over the window box once the fire was put out. He does not comment on why he refused to let anyone go inside and fight the fire or even evaluate its condition.

→ Ladder engine T-1 pulled up before BC-1 Berryman arrived (first to arrive). It made no attempt to put water on the fire and parked in its final location as if preplanned.

→ BC-1 Berryman refused to take critical information from the property owner as to the structure and nature of the building.

"Size up is ongoing throughout the incident. The IC must continually seek and evaluate new information, and prepare accordingly."

→ BC-1 Berryman completely fails in this procedure - It is as if he does not know this is his responsibility.

→ BC-1 Berryman never deviated from his course of assisting in burning down all the structures. He failed to take even exterior defensive actions he could have easily taken!

Establish Strategic Priorities

"The general order of priorities that the Incident Commander is responsible for establishing and implementing is as follows:

1. Provide for the safety and survival of all emergency personnel."

→ This is the only priority BC-1 Berryman observed.

2. "Provide for the safety and survival of the public, both involved and not involved in the incident, and provide care to those injured."

→ BC-1 Berryman never showed any concern for the citizens downwind from the fire and never bothered to see if people were in the burning building.

3. "Stabilize the incident."

→ BC-1 Berryman never stabilized anything - He aggressively promotes the fire from start to end.

4. "Protect the environment."

→ BC-1 Berryman put no effort in protecting the creek with wattle or other measures.

SLOCF - E.O. 701.00

FIREGROUND STRATEGY

WITHIN A STRUCTURED RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN

• "We may risk our lives a little, in a calculated manner, to protect savable [emphasis added] property."

→ BC-1 Berryman stated at the beginning of the fire to property owner, Richard Ferris, "We are going to take NO RISK to save your property." - This statement totally violated E.O. 701.00 rules on fireground strategy and questions his understanding of his actual purpose and the job of firefighters.

→ BC-1 Berryman would not listen to details of interior construction, fire breaks, nor any other details regarding the structure from the property owner who was very familiar with the structure of the building. This clearly suggests his predetermination to not put out the fire and total disregard for E.O. 701.00 as well as to the safety of those at the scene where knowledge and details are required.

OFFENSIVE STRATEGY

" Incident Commanders must not lose sight of the very simple and basic fireground reality that at some point firefighters must engage and fight the fire [emphasis added]. IC's must structure whatever operations are required to put water on the fire [emphasis added]. The rescue/fire control-extension/exposure problem is solved in the majority of cases by a fast, strong, well-placed attack. An attack plan must be established that overpowers the fire with actual [emphasis added] water application, either from offensive or defensive positions."

→ BC-1 Berryman refused to ever consider fighting the fire - His first action was a ladder to the roof to cut holes, NOT to ventilate for safer interior firefighting which he would not allow, but to assist in burning down the structure.

→ BC-1 Berryman, at no point, allowed water to be put on the fire from inside any of the buildings. In the first 30 minutes, fast water on the fire burning above the window box would have ended the fire and saved 95% of the structures! This could have been done both quickly and safely.

→ There was no legitimate reason to have not aggressively fought this fire in the first minutes! BC-1 Berryman offers none in his narrative.

Offensive Considerations

• "An important factor to consider in making the determination to perform an offensive attack is the density and velocity of smoke exiting the structure. The darker, denser, higher volume, and more turbulent the smoke, the more dangerous the interior conditions are. Firefighter safety and victim survivability both decrease in these conditions. Ventilation becomes critical to safety and survivability."

→ In their written narratives, three separate Fire Department personnel claim heavy, black smoke to justify their refusal to go into The Sub. Video evidence shows only light, thin smoke at this early part of the fire when this decision not to enter was continued by Captain Vasquez [see video: Vasquez opening door and light smoke only]. Stating the opposite of what existed may provide cover without video, but there was lots of video and no thick, dense smoke early in the fire once the window box fire was put out. There was no justifiable reason not to go inside and put out the fire! - We think that's why the narratives make false statements.

→ The front room end-of-roof louvers near the fire seat did not close. The main roof louver was open and firemen on the roof cut open the roof hatch first thing. These three vents were completely venting the fire, making for an ideal and safe scenario for an interior attack.

• "The Incident Commander must "get ahead" of the fire. Critical decisions must be made that relate to cutoff points and center on a "worst-case" fire control strategy."

→ No cutoff points were identified in any narrative. There was no effort at any firewall or cutoff point to stop the fire. There were at least 11 potential cutoff points in the Square Deal fire and none were considered or utilized.

→ BC-1 Berryman created a worst-case scenario by his aggressive actions to AID, intensify, and spread the fire. A quick clean burn seemed to be his only strategy.

• "Ventilation is a major component to structural firefighting that must be addressed during enclosed or concealed [emphasis added] space interior attacks. This must be initiated early and be well coordinated [emphasis added]. Ventilation openings should be made close to or above the fire area [emphasis added]. Refer to EO 707.00 Tactical Support Functions for more information."

→ The Sub had zero enclosed or concealed spaces that would require extra ventilation beyond the two open end-of-roof vents and the cut open attic hatch. For the first 30 minutes or better, the initial fire was ventilating perfectly for firefighting out the top louver over the fire above the window boxes and the roof hatch which had been opened by firemen - The end louver on the main roof was also venting well [see video: venting well].

→ In The Sub, more ventilation openings were cut 40 feet from firefront on the opposite side of the roof. In Square Deal, multiple large openings were cut in the east roof above the 303 Higuera Street entry. At the back of the same roof, two large openings (one on each side of the interior firewall) were cut - Both cuts were done before any fire would have been within 50' of the cuts or even in the main Square Deal building at all.

DEFENSIVE STRATEGY

"If defensive operations are conducted from the outset of the incident, the IC should notify incoming units that this will be a defensive fire.

The decision to operate in a defensive strategy indicates that the offensive attack strategy, or the potential for one, has been abandoned [emphasis added] for reasons of personnel safety, reasonable confirmation that there are no victims inside, an untenable fire environment, and/or the involved structure has been conceded as lost (the Incident Commander made a conscious decision that the structure cannot be saved) or is in danger of imminent collapse."

→ At the beginning of the fire, none of these conditions actually existed at The Sub and a quick interior attack would have put most the fire out in five minutes or less.

→ No narrative confirms that BC-1 Berryman considered any issues other than personal safety. As it's always safer not to fight a fire when "personal safety is your only consideration, buildings will always be burned if firefighter "personal safety" is the only consideration.

→ BC-1 Berryman started with a defensive strategy and then never re-evaluated the fire. His narrative is strangely mute on this subject considering the significance and importance of the decision to destroy two 44-year old San Luis Obispo establishments. He refused to allow any firefighters to go inside who would have quickly and easily put the fire out!

→ None of the reasons stated by SLO City FD members amount to a reason to only consider a defensive strategy. In exaggerated narratives applied to The Sub, (where the fire started), they describe only a small portion of Square Deal interior (where the fire did not reach for over three hours).

→ For BC-1 Berryman to know nobody was inside, he would have had to talk to the "off-duty" fireman who we think started the fire! No one from SLO City FD even cleared The Sub or Square Deal in any of their narratives or in fact.

Defensive Standard Operating Guideline

1. "Take Command"

2. "Evaluate fire spread/write-off lost property"

→ When BC-1 Berryman first arrived, only the front window boxes were on fire and very little could be "written off." SLO City FD leadership had two hours to prepare a defense for Square Deal but did nothing. They seemed to have written off everything the moment they arrived.

3. "Establish collapse perimeter"

4. "Identify key tactical positions"

→ No key tactical positions were identified in narratives or acted from during the fire - Only positions to watch the fire burn, and spray water on non-burning roofs, walls, and already burnt areas. No stop points or defensive positions. Lots of "water for show."

5. "Prioritize fire streams/protect exposures"

→ No water was ever intentionally put on the underside of any roof or at the seat of any fire.

→ Lots of water sprayed onto walls, onto roofs not on fire, and just up into the air for show and to impress the public.

These are some of the stop points BC-1 Berryman should have prioritized for defensive action:

1. By rear door to The Sub at 100 Pismo Street

2. Through the big rolling door into beaded curtain room at 100 Pismo Street

3. At firewall break in poster/CD staging room

4. Through holes cut into 283 Higuera Street (blacklight room) doors and by the masonry firewall separating 283 from 295 Higuera Street with only a doorway

5. Along the wall between The Sub and apartment

6. Along the wall between the apartment and Square Deal dock

7. Dock roof to keep fire out of comic locker

8. Either side of firewall on inside of main Square Deal building

9. By The Sub office and firewall opening from The Sub

10. At the other firewall opening in the poster room

11. Through the roll-up door at 150 Pismo Street

12. [see monograph: 7 Paths to Fight the Fire at The Sub]

13. [see monograph: 11 Basic Stop Points into SDRS from Rear]

→ BC-1 Berryman refused to consider stationing and using any defensive hoses.

→ Any of these actions would have stopped the fire at any of these points.

→ BC-1 Berryman refused to defend any of these firewalls or fight the fire at any stop points.

6. "Provide big, well placed streams"

→ No well-placed streams. Only streams through ventilation openings to spread the fire or water for show. This is NOT what is supposed to be done.

→ No well-placed streams through any opening to stop or fight the fire.

→ No well-placed streams through main apartment window (only seconds).

→ No well-placed streams through 100 Pismo Street door.

→ No well-placed streams through 100-B Pismo Street door.

→ No well-placed streams through 9'x9' rolled-up door.

7. "Pump water/maintain water supply"

→ 3.5 million gallons of water wasted on a fire that should have been put out in the first 5 minutes with the 300 gallons of water on T-1 fire truck (first at the scene).

→ 4-1/2' of water filled the basement ruining over 250,000 LPs, 200,000 CDs, and 20,000 video games.

8. "Quick determination on additional resources"

→ BC-1 Berryman summons all resources available, but does not assign a Rapid Intervention Team/Firefighter Assist and Search Team to support potential interior actions.

9. "Surround and drown"

→ BC-1 Berryman calls in massive support for a small window box fire at the very beginning, suggesting he plans for a really big fire.

→ Nowhere in a defensive strategy does it suggest you should cut huge vent holes in the roofs as far from the seat of fire as feasible! This is what SLO City FD leadership did throughout the fire, with no intention of fighting from inside. This is more like arson than firefighting.

→ BC-1 Berryman refuses to put water on the fire burning inside to the right of The Sub front door, even safely from outside as defensive strategy regulates. This refusal is what caused the fire to burn into Square Deal.

SLOCF - E.O. 703.00

STRUCTURE FIREGROUND SAFETY

GENERAL FIREGROUND SAFETY GUIDELINES

"All personnel entering the fireground perimeter must:

• Wear proper PPE, including SCBA
• All others stay outside [emphasis added]"

→ Chief Olson violated this rule grossly when he led Raymond Hanson, Warren Ferris, and Sharliss Ferris into the rear of Square Deal through smoke without any safety equipment. This occurred between 12:35 and 12:45pm. No actual fire was in Square Deal yet, only hazy thin stationary white/gray smoke was present.

The trip was cut short when Chief Olson (20' in the lead) saw activity by other firemen along The Sub office wall. He suddenly reversed direction and claimed the smoke (which was the same thin light smoke as all along) had gotten too thick to continue. He then hustled everybody back out the way he had brought them in.

Fire Attack

" When operating in an offensive strategy, personnel should be aggressively offensive. An effective, coordinated interior attack operation directed toward knocking down the fire often eliminates most eventual safety problems [emphasis added]."

→ SLO City FD leadership seemed unaware of this guideline and never considered it. Five minutes of this action at the beginning, and the fire would have been over with minimal damage! Since they have so few fires to fight (less than one per year), it is possible that SLO City FD leadership does not actually know how to fight a structure fire safely??

SLOCF - E.O. 704.00

TWO IN - TWO OUT

PURPOSE

"The San Luis Obispo City Fire Department employs a philosophy of quick response and safe, aggressive interior fire attack to stop structure fires in the early stages when possible. To comply with the CAL/OSHA Respiratory Protection Rules (California Code of Regulations, Title 8/ 5144/ (g)), and with NFPA 1500 8.4 "Members Operating at Emergency Incidents," and to promote safe interior firefighting, the following "Two In/Two Out" guidelines are adopted.

The intent of these guidelines is to assure that crews operating inside a structure fire or other IDLH (immediately dangerous to life and health) atmosphere shall always have full personal protective equipment (PPE) donned, always operate in groups of two or more, and have at least one group of two or more equipped firefighters outside the structure available to rescue the interior crews."

→ Chief Olson seemed totally unaware of E.O. 704.00 by not bringing along another firefighter when going into the rear of Square Deal with Raymond Hanson, Warren Ferris, and Sharliss Ferris.

→ By their failure to do an aggressive interior fire attack during the early fire in The Sub, SLO City FD leadership caused all the destruction that followed.

→ When dark brown smoke erupts from the front of Square Deal, a gaggle of firemen wait anxiously in front of the 303 Higuera Street door for the lone fireman who was inside Square Deal to exit. We think this fireman started the fire in front of Square Deal and that is why he was alone. The smoke is the wrong color for a wood and paper fire.

SLOCF - E.O. 707.00

TACTICAL SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

LADDERS AND LIGHTING

• "At least 2 ladders (one may be the aerial ladder) should be placed to the roof when roof operations are being performed."

→ There apparently was so little danger that BC-1 Berryman used only one ladder at the corner of 303 Higuera Street to send his chainsaw team onto the roof over and over.

• "Lighting must be provided in interior operations when necessary."

→ BC-1 Berryman cut power to Square Deal over 90 minutes before any fire got to the building - This left a dark (unfamiliar to firefighters) warehouse that would be far more dangerous to firefighters than a safely lit warehouse. Why cut power two hours before the fire came in? Why not leave it safely lit unless you can't stop the fire or at least until it enters the structure - Stopping the fire from entering Square Deal would have been easier and safer with lighting. The manual states to make sure where the main electrical panel is located and shutoff electricity as appropriate, not to kill power and cause zero visibility to defend two hours before the fire reaches the structure.

OPENING UP - ACCESS - FORCIBLE ENTRY

The following list is generally known as "softening the structure."

• "All access doors at a working structure fire should be unlocked or forced.

o Doors and windows that are left open can increase fire activity. After securing access, best to leave them closed until crews are ready [emphasis added]."

→ Crews were not ready to conduct an interior attack when, immediately upon arrival, BC-1 Berryman ordered all doors opened and all windows broken to feed uncontrolled amounts of air into the fire. For Square Deal, he had almost two hours to station a defensive hose at multiple positions and did nothing. He left all doors and windows open - Even the refrigerator door to the comic locker was open (providing the only source of air for the refrigerator room) that would allow it to burn.

UTILITIES

• "Electrical panels

o Can be anywhere on or in the building, often found below weather head/drop. The main is usually outside on single family residences, and in a utility room in larger buildings.

o Due to the prevalence of add-on construction in the City, many sub-panels exist on structures - make sure you find the main panel.

o Best - shutoff main circuit switch if it's obvious

o Next best - shutoff all circuits - note which (if any) have been tripped prior to shutoff

o Dangerous - Not recommended - Do not remove the electrical meter."

→ Rather than turning off power in Square Deal as fit the actual situation, BC-1 Berryman ordered the wires cut feeding Square Deal - leaving the fire scene in total darkness hours before the fire was brought into Square Deal.

VENTILATION

• "Ventilation provides for the removal of heat, smoke, and toxic products of combustion from a structure to improve visibility and tenability inside [emphasis added]. This aids in locating the fire and the safety and survivability of victims and firefighters inside [emphasis added]."

→ Ventilation is to be done to help interior firefighting - There was no interior firefighting, therefore, no need to cut big holes that only served to draft the fire and increase the fire temperature - But without helping the fire along or fighting the fire, the fire would have taken three days or more. This would embarrass SLO City FD, be hard to explain, and who would understand all the inaction or their refusal to do what most of us feel is their job - fight the fire!

• "Vertical ventilation, if needed, should happen early in the incident, and should be coordinated (via the IC) with interior crews."

→ No interior crews and no coordinated interior attack, so no legitimate reason to cut all the big holes, (over 16 were cut before SLO City FD was done).

• "Roof crews should always have 2 means of egress placed to roof."

→ Only one provided for most of fire.

• "The vertical ventilation crew on the roof must try to create a hole as much over the fire [emphasis added] location if possible, but only if it can be safely performed."

→ All holes were cut far from fire location - 40 foot in The Sub and almost 100 foot away in Square Deal. So far, we have found evidence of over 16 vent holes cut to spread the fire.

VERTICAL VENTILATION STANDARD OPERATING GUIDELINES

• "Place 2 ladders to different corners."

→ Only one ladder was used most of the fire.

SLOCF - E.O. 708.00

APPARATUS PLACEMENT AT STRUCTURE FIRES

COMMAND VEHICLE PLACEMENT

• "Spot the command vehicle in a manner that will allow maximum visibility of the fire building and surrounding area and the general effect of the companies operating on the fire."

→ This was not done - BC-1 Berryman could not see the fire. His only visibility was the firewall separating 303 and 307 Higuera Street, where we think he planned to burn the fire to. We think, by choosing this location, Berryman was at the point he PLANNED to burn the structure to. He went directly there as soon as he arrived. He stationed ladder truck T-1 there before he arrived. He could not see the fire at all from this position until around 2:00pm, when it had finally burned to his location!

SLOCF - E.O. 711.00

PROPERTY CONSERVATION

INTENT

"The activities that relate to effective property conservation require the same early and on-going command functions and aggressive action as both Rescue and Fire Control. Effective property conservation can greatly enhance our "customer service" and make life after the fire much better for the occupants. All San Luis Obispo City Fire Department members are expected to perform in a manner that continually reduces loss during fire operations, and that assists the customer during this traumatic event."

→ We can find no part of E.O. 711.00 that BC-1 Berryman or Fire Chief Olson took into account or even seemed to be aware of.

→ A Fire Chief who has been in the community for barely four years does not flinch at totally destroying two local businesses that have been in the community over 44 years.

→ BC-1 Berryman stated, "We will take NO RISK TO SAVE YOUR PROPERTY," (meaning he has declared a defensive strategy upon arrival) - He states this to the business owner less than 15 minutes after the fire started. To make such a statement at this point of the fire is little different than to say, "We are going to burn down everything and there is nothing you can do about it."

→ Neither Chief Olson nor BC-1 Berryman feels that E.O. 711.00 applies to them or the community they are supposed to serve.

→ No water was put on any fire until most everything was well burned. If a total loss was SLO City FD leadership's goal, they succeeded.