The Sub Burndown

Saturday December 26, 2015

 

Section 1
- The Sub Fire -

 
6 Minutes With The Arsonist
Incendiary #1 — The timeline of initial events that sparked suspicion of arson.
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Fire Investigation Never Done
Cover-up of The Sub Fire started two days later…
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SLO City FD Failure to Evacuate
Clearing the building and ensuring nobody is inside - a crucial step neglected by the SLO City FD.
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No R.I.T. or F.A.S.T Crew Assigned
BC-1 Berryman not only did not assign a R.I.T./F.A.S.T. crew, he put his command post where the fire did eventually burn to…
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The Sub Fire Load & Interior Details
Store inventory and layout tells a different tale...
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Sub Roof Details
The Sub and SDRS had a complete recent earthquake upgrade...to achieve a one-hour Class A roof fire rating.
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Seven Paths To Enter & Fight The Fire At The Sub
The Sub was unique in how many ways it would have been easy to fight a fire.
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Burning A Building Down Is Not Firefighting
You can't put a structure fire out with chainsaws.
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Unknown Incendiary Device #2
Our assertion is that all evidence points to UID #2, having been ignited on top of The Sub.
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3001 Bahia Court Fire

SLO City FD responded to the fire fairly quickly…

 

SLO City FD

  • First call to 911 at 11:17am with the first fire truck arriving between 11:23am and 11:25am
  • They were informed of a victim inside at 11:24 (according to radiocity.radio.net)
  • The fire was declared defensive from the start, according to J. MacDonald's narrative
  • According to Captain Vasquez, first they cut holes into the roof and then they went defensive (after focusing and accelerating the fire with the holes) — they were not going inside, so no holes should have been cut — see picture of holes provided
  • According to Deputy Chief Aggson, after the roof burned through, they used the ladder truck to "complete elevated stream extinguishment".
  • They cut the holes and accelerated the fire before they went in to look for the victim!
  • Devin Reiss' narrative claimed body was inside front door to right. Fire Investigator was told body was straight ahead in the kitchen. Fire scene looked like the body would have been in the closest bedroom.
  • 11:57am - 33 minutes after they arrive, and know a victim is inside, they finally go in. By now the victim is surely dead — even if he was alive when they arrived, 30 seconds is what we believe they do, 30 minutes was the reality
  • 1:45pm - Over two hours later, after roof is gone and fire is put out with overhead ladder truck master stream, the firemen finally go inside
  • Final result: House completely gutted and victim dead and cooked beyond recognition
  • When you read the professional narrative, please notice how little thought or concern is in evidence for the victim
  • They say they will take great risk if a life is at stake, but their culture of risk aversion required 30 minutes for an act that should have taken 30 seconds

Standard operating procedure for SLO City FD.



Bahia Court / Alrita Fire Transcript of Recorded Calls

(Sourcefile) Alrita Bahia Calls

Alrita Bahia Call 1

Alrita Bahia Call 2

Alrita Bahia Call 9

Alrita Bahia Call 10

Alrita Bahia Call 11

Alrita Bahia Call 12

"Roof Swiss Army"
Alrita Bahia Call 16

Alrita Bahia Call 18

Alrita Bahia Call 19

Alrita Bahia Call 24

Alrita Bahia Call 41

Alrita Bahia Call 42

Section 2
- Square Deal Recordings & Supplies (SDRS) Fire -

 
The Sub Office Fire Proves Fire Did Not Come into Front of SDRS from The Sub through the Firewall Between the Two Businesses

The Sub/ SDRS Corp.© stands to prove the fire did not come into front of SDRS through the firewall of The Sub
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Unknown Incendiary Device #3 in SDRS

How did the fire go from The Sub to the front of Square Deal Recordings & Supplies when the fire was out in the portion of The Sub adjoining the front of Square Deal before the fire started in the front of Square Deal?
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SDRS Fire Load Notes

The SLO City FD leadership has repeatedly stated we had a huge fire load at Square Deal Recordings & Supplies. This is relatively untrue and totally untrue from the perspective of the two hours they had to stop the fire that was not yet in our building or prevent it from entering Square Deal.
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11 Basic Stop Points for Preventing Fire Spread into SDRS from Rear

11 basic stop points for preventing fire spread into Square Deal Recordings & Supplies from the rear (Pismo Street)
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Hole Map Illustration

Holes cut by members of SLO City FD and incendiary devices placed by unknown person(s)
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Section 3
- San Luis Obispo City Fire Department (SLO City FD) Issues -

 
SLOCF Fire Calls 2009-2016
History of success rate in San Luis Obispo fires.
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SLOCF Press Release Corrections
These are what we believe to be factual corrections to SLOCF Chief Garret Olson's press release…
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Bravest Act or a Cowardly, Evil Act?
Cutting holes in roofs is something firemen do but most civilians can't tell...
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Is BC-1 Berryman an Arsonist?
In evaluating the actions of Berryman, we have come to the following realizations...
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Total Destruction is a Job Well Done
Total destruction considered a job well done because no fireman was injured.
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SLOCF Fails to Follow Own Rules
We will state the appropriate rule from the current SLOCF manual and then what SLOCF actually did.
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SLOCF Underground "Burndown" Policy
SLOCF leadership seems to have an underground policy of refusing to go into buildings that are on fire.
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Is SLOCF Corrupt?
While none of these indicators singularly means corruption, a Fire Department guilty of most of these practices is certainly suspect, if not corrupt.
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How Can You Believe…?
Fire departments who fight few fires do not easily gain experience... There are three ways to deal with this…
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After listening to the Alrita Call logs to see what happened, these seem to be the critical recordings.
35 Minutes and 12 Seconds to go inside and look for the victim AFTER knowing he was inside.

CALL 1 – 11:19:02 AM – Fire Alarm (automated dispatch)

TRANSCRIPT: [Computer]: Cal Fire Truck 1, Engine 2, Engine 3, Engine 4, Battalion Chief 4, Structure Fire, Code 3, Structure Fire, RP Hung Up, 1655 Alrita Grid N-11, 1655 Alrita Grid N-11

CALL 2 – 11:19:49 AM – Human dispatch follows up with additional details, claims "Everybody is out of the house."

TRANSCRIPT: [Dispatch]: Units responding to the structure fire, it's gonna be at Alrita & Bahai, we're getting multiple 911s, everybody is out of the house.

CALL 9 – 11:23:23 AM – On Scene, establishing IC

TRANSCRIPT: [?] The City Fire Batallion 4 is on the scene, establishing Alrita IC. Uh, This is going to be a working incident, we've got a fully involved structure, with, uh, multiple exposures, uh, continue all incoming, we've got a hydrant right in front of the, uh, house, and um, all units on your arrival switch to TAC.

CALL 10 – 11:24:40 AM – Call for ambulance code 3 (with lights and sirens), stating there was a "Possible Victim"

TRANSCRIPT: [Truck 2] Two on scene [Dispatch] Copy two on scene [IC] This is city fire from, um, uh, Alrita IC, grab me an ambulance code 3 if you haven't already. ?Break? we may have a victim [Dispatch] Copy starting ambulance code 3, possible victim.

CALL 11 – 11:25:23 AM – States that ventilation will not be used. (Although it was used a short time later)

TRANSCRIPT: [?] Inaudible [?] Truck 1 from Alrita IC, come up and uh, assist engine 3 and engine 2. Uh, doesn't look like we're going to be going ventilation on this. [Truck 1] Truck copy. [?] Inaudible

CALL 12 – 11:35:18 AM - Request for more equipment.

TRANSCRIPT: []City fire from,… Alrita IC [Dispatch]Alrita IC []If uh, Chief Barryman hasn't already done it, let's request two more engines from the –c, uh, from Cal-Fire, one to support the city, and one to respond to the structure fire [Dispatch] Copy, two from Cal-Fire, one for city, one for structure fire

CALL 16 – 11:45:23 AM – Alrita IC asks for the ambulance crew to switch to TAC-1 and move to the front of the building. This seems to imply will soon be an attempt to go inside and recover any possible victims.

TRANSCRIPT: [Alrita IC] City From Alrita IC [Dispatch] Alrita IC [Alrita IC] On TAC with ambulance that's on scene, have them contact me on city TAC 1, and respond to the front of the structure, with their gear [] San Luis ambulance, Alrita IC on City Net.

CALL 18 – 11:53:52 AM - Confirms the time of the first call received about the fire, 11:17 AM

TRANSCRIPT: [] IC, Go [Dispatch] IC, time of call 11:17, time of dispatch 11:18.

CALL 19 – 11:54:17 AM - Confirms the time of first arrival on the scene, 11:22 AM

TRANSCRIPT: [Dispatch] Time of first arrival 11:22.

CALL 24 – 11:59:52 AM – Went inside and confirmed 11-44 (Possible Fatality), asks for coroner. It took 35 minutes and 12 seconds to go inside after knowing there is a victim inside (see CALL 10)

TRANSCRIPT: [] City Fire, Alrita IC [Dispatch] Alrita IC [] We have a, uh, confirmed 11-44, we're gonna need, uh, coroner please.

CALL 41 – 1:45:03 PM – 1st recovery crews go inside for recovery of victim

TRANSCRIPT: []City fire Alrita IC on city net. [Dispatch] Alrita IC [] Can you time stamp and enter in the cad comments bit crews are making entry for a recovery at this moment. [Dispatch] City fire copy.

CALL 42 – 2:03:20 PM – Confirming recovery crews have recovered the body of the victim and are now outside.

TRANSCRIPT: [] City Fire Alrita IC on City Net. [Dispatch] Alrita IC [] Could you time stamp recovery is complete, crews are outside. [Dispatch] Copy recovery is complete, good job.




 

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SLO City FD Target Hazard List

San Luis Obispo City Fire Department Target Hazard List - updated


 

Section 4
- Comments, Observations and Correction on Narratives by SLO City FD -

 
Preamble to Narratives
The overall situation with the SLOCF narratives is that they seem to be an attempt to cover up gross negligence, professional malfeasance, and cowardice…
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SLOCF Battalion Chief-A Neal Berryman
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Battalion Chief-A Neal Berryman
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SLOCF Deputy Chief Jeff Gater
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Deputy Chief Jeff Gater
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SLOCF Chief Garret Olson
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Chief Garret Olson
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SLOCF Captain Michael King
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain Michael King
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SLOCF Captain Mark Vasquez
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain Mark Vasquez
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SLOCF Captain Matt Callahan
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain Matt Callahan
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SLOCF Captain-Paramedic Station 3A David Marshall
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain-Paramedic Station 3A David Marshall
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