SLO City FD Fails To Follow Their Own Rules ^v2.2

The following notations and comments are to point out the portions of San Luis Obispo City Fire – Emergency Operations Manual that San Luis Obispo City Fire Department (SLO City FD) did NOT follow at The Sub and Square Deal Recordings & Supplies fire, and does not follow at most fires. Failure to follow their own official written guidelines, policies, and procedures resulted in the total destruction of two San Luis Obispo businesses that had both been in the community 44+ years, and the total destruction of every property with a serious fire at least the last ten years.

→ BC-1 Berryman circled the building once in his pickup as he arrived but did none of the other actions. He seems to have arrived with a predetermined decision to not fight the fire. He would allow no firefighter to enter The Sub during the crucial early minutes of the fire or at any subsequent time. He summons massive reinforcements when the fire is still small and only in the front of The Sub.

→ BC-1 Berryman makes no notes or comments in his narrative regarding sizing up the fire over the window box once the fire was put out. He does not comment on why he refused to let anyone go inside and fight the fire or even evaluate its condition after the original fire was out.

→ Ladder engine T-1 pulled up as BC-1 Berryman arrived (first to arrive). It made no attempt to put water on the fire and parked in its final location as if preplanned. It does nothing to attack the fire but starts pulling out ladders and chainsaws to cut holes into the roof.

• BC-1 Berryman refused to take critical information from the property owner as to the structure and nature of the building that he would need to competently fight the fire.

"Size up is ongoing throughout the incident. The IC must continually seek and evaluate new information, and prepare accordingly."

→ BC-1 Berryman completely fails in this procedure – It is as if he does not know this is his responsibility. BC-1 Berryman never deviated from his course of assisting in burning down all the structures. He failed to take even exterior defensive actions, he could have easily taken, which would have kept Square Deal from becoming involved!

Establish Strategic Priorities

"The general order of priorities that the Incident Commander is responsible for establishing and implementing is as follows: &"Provide for the safety and survival of all emergency personnel.

1. "Provide for the safety and survival of all emergency personnel."

→ This is the only priority we found that BC-1 Berryman observed.

2. "Provide for the safety and survival of the public, both involved and not involved in the incident, and provide care to those injured."

→ BC-1 Berryman never showed any concern for the citizens downwind from the fire and never bothered to see if people were in the burning building.

3. "Stabilize the incident."

→ BC-1 Berryman never stabilized anything - He aggressively promotes the fire from start to end. Without SLOCFD's actions, the fire would not have left The Sub even if no one showed up at all!

4. "Protect the environment."

→ BC-1 Berryman put no effort in protecting the creek with wattle or other measures.
→ BC-1 Berryman did not consider the pollution in the air and the later pollution that would be generated in disposal of the burned debris when he decided not to fight the fire.

SLOCF - E.O. 701.00

FIREGROUND STRATEGY

WITHIN A STRUCTURED RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN

• "We may risk our lives a little, in a calculated manner, to protect savable [emphasis added] property."

→ BC-1 Berryman and SLOCFD policies only pretend to do this. In reality, they refuse to rush in and put out fires.
→ BC-1 Berryman had over two hours to get ready to defend Square Deal, yet he chose to only take action that would promote and spread the fire.
→ BC-1 Berryman stated at the beginning of the fire to property owner, Richard Ferris, "We are going to take NO RISK to save your property." - This statement totally violated E.O. 701.00 rules on fireground strategy and questions his understanding of his actual purpose and the job of firefighters.
→ BC-1 Berryman would not listen to details of interior construction, fire breaks, nor any other details regarding the structure from the property owner who was very familiar with the structure of the building. This clearly suggests his predetermination to not put out the fire and shows his total disregard for E.O. 701.00 and E.O. 711.00.
→ BC-1 Berryman refused to take any risk, with no concern he was about to destroy 100% savable property, and two local businesses and the jobs they provide! BC-1 Berryman wanted a big fire so he could be a "hero".

OFFENSIVE STRATEGY

→ SLOCFD does not do offensive strategy at fires but they claim to be an aggressive interior firefighting company in their manual and website."

"Incident Commanders must not lose sight of the very simple and basic fireground reality that at some point firefighters must engage and fight the fire [emphasis added]. IC's must structure whatever operations are required to put water on the fire [emphasis added]. The rescue/fire control-extension/exposure problem is solved in the majority of cases by a fast, strong, well-placed attack. An attack plan must be established that overpowers the fire with actual [emphasis added] water application, either from offensive or defensive positions."

→ BC-1 Berryman refused to ever consider fighting the fire – His first action was a ladder to the roof to cut holes, NOT to ventilate for safer interior firefighting which he would not allow, but to assist in burning down the structure.

• BC-1 Berryman, at no point, allowed water to be put on the fire from inside any of the buildings. In the first 30 minutes, fast water on the fire burning above the window box would have ended the fire and saved 95% of the structures! This could have been done both quickly and safely.

• There was no legitimate reason to have not aggressively fought this fire in the first minutes! BC-1 Berryman offers none in his narrative.

• BC-1 Berryman, at no point in the fire allowed any defensive water to be put on the fire though any of the multiple doors that would have at least kept the fire in The Sub.

Offensive Considerations

• "An important factor to consider in making the determination to perform an offensive attack is the density and velocity of smoke exiting the structure. The darker, denser, higher volume, and more turbulent the smoke, the more dangerous the interior conditions are. Firefighter safety and victim survivability both decrease in these conditions. Ventilation becomes critical to safety and survivability."

→ In their written narratives, three separate Fire Department personnel claim heavy, black smoke to justify their refusal to go into The Sub. Video evidence shows only light, thin smoke at this early part of the fire when this decision not to enter was continued by Captain Vasquez [see our video documentary showing Captain Vasquez opening the front door and only light smoke and good visibility]. Stating the opposite of what existed may provide cover without video, but there was lots of video and no thick, dense smoke early in the fire once the window box fire was put out. There was no justifiable reason not to go inside and put out the fire! – We think that's why the coordinated narratives make false statements.
→ The front room end-of-roof ventilation louvers near the fire seat did not close. The main roof louver was open and firemen on the roof cut open the roof hatch first thing. These three vents were completely venting the fire, making for an ideal and safe scenario for an interior attack.

• "The Incident Commander must "get ahead" of the fire. Critical decisions must be made that relate to cutoff points and center on a "worst-case" fire control strategy."

→ BC-1 Berryman never evaluated the fire, except to move it through the structure quickly. No cutoff points were identified in any narrative. There was no effort at any firewall or cutoff point to stop the fire. There were at least 11 potential cutoff points in the Square Deal fire and none were considered or utilized.
→ See monographs: "7 Paths to Enter and Fight the Fire at The Sub" and "11 Basic Stop Points for Preventing Fire Spread into SDRS from the Rear" for more details.
→ BC-1 Berryman created a worst-case scenario by his aggressive actions to AID, intensify, and spread the fire. A quick massive burn and having a big fire were to be his main concern.

• "Ventilation is a major component to structural firefighting that must be addressed during enclosed or concealed [emphasis added] space interior attacks. This must be initiated early and be well coordinated [emphasis added]. Ventilation openings should be made close to or above the fire area [emphasis added].
Refer to EO 707.00 Tactical Support Functions for more information."

→ "Close to or above the fire area" is the opposite of what BC-Berryman did – The two huge 8'x8' holes and three other holes in The Sub roof were all far away from the seat of the fire and not coordinated with anyone, because no one was allowed inside.
→ The Sub had zero enclosed or concealed spaces that would require extra ventilation beyond the two open end-of-roof vents and the cut-open attic hatch. For the first 30 minutes or better, the initial fire was ventilating perfectly for firefighting out the top louvers over the fire above the window boxes and in the main room. The roof hatch (which had been opened by firemen) and the end louver on the main roof were also venting well.
→ In The Sub, more ventilation openings were cut 40 feet from fire front on the opposite side of the roof. In Square Deal, multiple large openings were cut in the east roof above the 303 Higuera Street entry. At the back of the same roof, two large openings (one on each side of the interior firewall) were cut – All cuts were done well before any fire would have been within 50' of the cuts or even in the main Square Deal building at all. At least six other draft holes were cut into the Square Deal roof well ahead of the fire.
→ "Well coordinated" means no hole-cutting until firemen with hoses are inside and ready to put water on the seat of the fire – No one was allowed inside so there was zero coordination possible.
→ None of the firefighter-written leadership narratives or other facts confirm that BC-1 Berryman considered any issues other than his preference for a big fire and unwillingness to take any risk. He claims it's about safety, but it's always safer not to fight a fire when quot;personnel safetyquot; is your only consideration. Buildings will always be burned if firefighter quot;personnel safetyquot; and taking zero risk are the only considerations.

DEFENSIVE STRATEGY

"If defensive operations are conducted from the outset of the incident, the IC should notify incoming units that this will be a defensive fire.

The decision to operate in a defensive strategy indicates that the offensive attack strategy, or the potential for one, has been abandoned [emphasis added] for reasons of personnel safety, reasonable confirmation that there are no victims inside, an untenable fire environment, and/or the involved structure has been conceded as lost (the Incident Commander made a conscious decision that the structure cannot be saved) or is in danger of imminent collapse."

→ At the beginning of the fire, none of these conditions actually existed at The Sub and a quick interior attack would have put most the fire out in five minutes or less.
→ No narrative confirms that BC-1 Berryman considered any of this.
→ BC-1 Berryman started with a defensive strategy and then never re-evaluated the fire. His narrative is strangely mute on this subject considering the significance and importance of the decision to destroy two 44-year old San Luis Obispo establishments. He refused to allow any firefighters to go inside that would have quickly and easily put the fire out.
→ None of the reasons stated by SLO City FD members amount to a reason to only consider a defensive strategy. In exaggerated narratives applied to The Sub, (where the fire started), they describe only a small portion of Square Deal interior (where the fire did not reach for over three hours).
→ Once the window box fire was put out, a re-evaluation would have found only a small easy-to-fight fire burning above the window boxes – 10 seconds of hose would have put it out. For BC-1 Berryman to know nobody was inside, he would have had to talk to the "off-duty" fireman who we think started the fire! No one from SLO City FD ever checked The Sub or Square Deal for people in any of their narratives or later that day at the fire.

Defensive Standard Operating Guideline

1. "Take Command"

2. Evaluate fire spread/write-off lost property"

• When BC-1 Berryman first arrived, only the front window boxes were on fire, not the store itself. Very little could be "written off." – Yet he writes off the complete 6,000 square feet of The Sub when only the window box was on fire. He also writes off the 14,000 square feet adjoining business that did not catch fire for over two hours – A total 20,000 square feet of buildings destroyed to have his big fire.

• For Square Deal, SLO City FD leadership had two hours to prepare a defense but did nothing except open all doors and windows and cut holes in the roof well ahead of the fire. BC-1 Berryman seemed to have written off everything the moment he arrived.

3. "Establish collapse perimeter

4. Identify key tactical positions"

• No key tactical positions were identified in narratives or acted from during the fire – Only positions to aid the fire in burning, or to spray water on non-burning roofs, walls, and already burnt areas. No stop points or defensive positions. Lots of "water for show."

5. "Prioritize fire streams/protect exposures"

• No water was ever intentionally put on the underside of any roof or at the seat of any fire until the fire was past its peak.

• Lots of water sprayed onto walls, onto roofs not on fire, and just up into the air for show and to impress the public.

These are some of the stop points BC-1 Berryman should have prioritized for defensive action:

1. By rear door to The Sub at 100 Pismo Street

2. Through the big rolling door into beaded curtain room at 100 Pismo Street

3. At firewall break in poster/CD staging room

4. Through holes cut into 283 Higuera Street (blacklight room) doors and by the masonry firewall separating 283 from 295 Higuera Street with only a doorway

5. Along the wall between The Sub and apartment

6. Along the wall between the apartment and Square Deal dock

7. Dock roof to keep fire out of comic locker

8. Either side of firewall on inside of main Square Deal building

9. By The Sub office and firewall opening from The Sub

10. At the other firewall opening in the poster room

11. Through the roll-up door at 150 Pismo Street

12. [see monograph: 7 Paths to Fight the Fire at The Sub]

13. [see monograph: 11 Basic Stop Points into SDRS from Rear]

• BC-1 Berryman refused to consider stationing and using any defensive hoses.

• Any of these actions would have stopped the fire at any of these points.

• BC-1 Berryman refused to defend any of these firewalls or fight the fire at any stop points.

6. "Provide big, well placed streams"

• No well-placed streams. Only streams through ventilation openings to blow in entrained air to spread the fire or water for show. This is NOT what is supposed to be done.

• No well-placed streams through any window or door opening to stop or fight the fire.

• No well-placed streams through main apartment window.

• No well-placed streams through 100 Pismo Street door.

• No well-placed streams through 100-B Pismo Street door.

• No well-placed streams through 9'x9' rolled-up door.

• No well-placed streams except to blow in entrained air to expand the fire.

7. "Pump water/maintain water supply"

• 3.5 million gallons of water wasted on a fire that should have been put out in the first five minutes with the 300 gallons and quick action hose on T-1 fire truck (first at the scene).

• 4-1/2' of water filled the basement ruining over 250,000 LPs, 200,000 CDs, and 20,000 video games – SLO City FD refused to help pump the water out of the basement with their big pump truck.

8. "Quick determination on additional resources"

• BC-1 Berryman summons all mutual aid resources available at the very beginning of the fire, but does not assign a Rapid Intervention Team/Firefighter Assist and Search Team (R.I.C./F.A.S.T.) that would allow potential interior actions and actual fire attacks. BC-1 Berryman summons all available resources as he refuses to actually fight the fire.

9. "Surround and drown"

• BC-1 Berryman calls in massive mutual aid support for a small window box fire at the very beginning, suggesting he plans for a really big fire.

• Nowhere in a defensive strategy does it suggest you should cut huge vent holes in the roofs as far from the seat of fire as feasible! This is what SLO City FD leadership did throughout the fire, with no intention of fighting from inside. This is arson under the color of authority not firefighting.

• BC-1 Berryman refuses to put water on the fire visible and clearly burning inside to the right of The Sub front door, even safely from outside as defensive strategy dictates. He refused to put defensive water through any of The Sub's rear doors. This refusal is what caused the fire to burn into Square Deal.

• No water on any burning fires or through doors and windows onto the fire is the opposite of "surround and drown."

SLOCF - E.O. 703.00

STRUCTURE FIREGROUND SAFETY

GENERAL FIREGROUND SAFETY GUIDELINES

"All personnel entering the fireground perimeter must:

• Wear proper PPE, including SCBA
• All others stay outside [emphasis added]"

• Chief Olson violated this rule grossly when he led Raymond Hanson, Warren Ferris, and Sharliss Ferris into the rear of Square Deal through smoke without any safety equipment. No actual fire was in Square Deal yet, only hazy thin stationary white/gray smoke was present. This occurred between 12:50 and 1:00pm.

The trip was cut short when Chief Olson (20' in the lead) saw activity by other firemen in the A/D corner along The Sub office wall. Chief Olson suddenly reversed direction and claimed the smoke (which was the same thin light smoke as all along) had gotten too thick to continue. He then hustled everybody back out the way he had brought them in. We think this was when a firefighter was preparing to light a "backfire" in the front of Square Deal.

Fire Attack

" "When operating in an offensive strategy, personnel should be aggressively offensive. An effective, coordinated interior attack operation directed toward knocking down the fire often eliminates most eventual safety problems [emphasis added]." [emphasis added]."

• SLO City FD leadership seemed unaware of this guideline and never considered it. Five minutes of this action at the beginning, and the fire would have been over in 10 minutes with minimal damage! Since they have so few fires to fight (barely one per year), it seems true that SLO City FD leadership does not actually know how to fight a structure fire safely or at all? Burndowns are their best fire management skill set.

SLOCF - E.O. 704.00

TWO IN - TWO OUT

PURPOSE

"The San Luis Obispo City Fire Department employs a philosophy of quick response and safe, aggressive interior fire attack to stop structure fires in the early stages when possible. To comply with the CAL/OSHA Respiratory Protection Rules (California Code of Regulations, Title 8/ 5144/ (g)), and with NFPA 1500 8.4 "Members Operating at Emergency Incidents," and to promote safe interior firefighting, the following "Two In/Two Out" guidelines are adopted.

The intent of these guidelines is to assure that crews operating inside a structure fire or other IDLH (immediately dangerous to life and health) atmosphere shall always have full personal protective equipment (PPE) donned, always operate in groups of two or more, and have at least one group of two or more equipped firefighters outside the structure available to rescue the interior crews."

• Chief Olson seemed totally unaware of E.O. 704.00 by not bringing along another firefighter when going into the rear of Square Deal with Raymond Hanson, Warren Ferris, and Sharliss Ferris.

• By their failure to do an aggressive interior fire attack during the early fire in The Sub, SLO City FD leadership caused all the destruction that followed.

• When dark brown smoke erupted from the front of Square Deal, a gaggle of firemen are waiting anxiously in front of the 303 Higuera Street door for the lone fireman (King?) who was inside Square Deal alone to exit. We think this fireman started the backfire in front of Square Deal and that is why he was alone. The smoke that started just before he exits is the wrong color for a wood and paper only fire.

SLOCF - E.O. 707.00

TACTICAL SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

LADDERS AND LIGHTING

• "At least 2 ladders (one may be the aerial ladder) should be placed to the roof when roof operations are being performed."

• There apparently was so little danger that BC-1 Berryman used only one ladder at the corner of 303 Higuera Street to send his chainsaw team onto the roof over and over.

• "Lighting must be provided in interior operations when necessary."

• BC-1 Berryman cut power to Square Deal over 90 minutes before any fire got to the building – This left a dark (unfamiliar to firefighters) warehouse that would be far more dangerous to firefighters than a safely lit warehouse. Why cut power almost two hours before the fire came in? Why not leave it safely lit unless you can't stop the fire or at least until it enters the structure – Stopping the fire from entering Square Deal would have been easier and safer with lighting. The manual states to make sure where the main electrical panel is located and shutoff electricity as appropriate, not to kill power first thing without thinking and cause zero visibility impairing interior operation to defend Square Deal over two hours before the fire reaches the structure.

OPENING UP - ACCESS - FORCIBLE ENTRY

The following list is generally known as "softening the structure."

• "All access doors at a working structure fire should be unlocked or forced."

o Doors and windows that are left open can increase fire activity [emphasis added]. After securing access, best to leave them closed until crews are ready [emphasis added]."

• Crews were not allowed to conduct an interior attack when, immediately upon arrival, BC-1 Berryman ordered all doors (except The Sub front door) opened and all windows broken to feed uncontrolled amounts of air into the fire.
• For Square Deal, BC-Berryman had almost two hours to station a defensive hose at multiple positions and did nothing. He left all doors and windows open – Even the refrigerator door to the comic locker was open (providing the only source of air for the refrigerator room) that would allow it to burn.

UTILITIES

• "Electrical panels

• Can be anywhere on or in the building, often found below weather head/drop. The main is usually outside on single family residences, and in a utility room in larger buildings.

• Due to the prevalence of add-on construction in the City, many sub-panels exist on structures – make sure you find the main panel.

• Best - shutoff main circuit switch if it's obvious

• Next best – shutoff all circuits – note which (if any) have been tripped prior to shutoff

• Dangerous – Not recommended – Do not remove the electrical meter."

• • Rather than turning off power in Square Deal as fit the actual situation, BC-1 Berryman ordered the wires cut feeding Square Deal – leaving the fire scene in total darkness hours before the fire was brought into Square Deal.

VENTILATION

• "Ventilation provides for the removal of heat, smoke, and toxic products of combustion from a structure to improve visibility and tenability inside [emphasis added]. This aids in locating the fire and the safety and survivability of victims and firefighters inside [emphasis added]."

• Ventilation is to be done to helpinterior firefighting - There was no interior firefighting, therefore, no need to cut big holes that only served to draft the fire and increase the fire temperature – But without helping the fire along or fighting the fire, the fire would have taken three days or more. This would embarrass SLO City FD, be hard to explain, and who would understand all the inaction or their refusal to do what most of us feel is their job – fight the fire!

• "Vertical ventilation, if needed, should happen early in the incident, and should be coordinated (via the IC) with interior crews."

• No interior crews and no coordinated interior attack, so no legitimate reason to cut all the big holes, (over 16 were cut before SLO City FD was done).

• "Roof crews should always have 2 means of egress placed to roof."

• Only one provided for most of fire.

• "The vertical ventilation crew on the roof must try to create a hole as much over the fire [emphasis added] location if possible, but only if it can be safely performed."

• All holes were cut far from fire location – 40 foot in The Sub and almost 100 foot away in Square Deal. So far, we have found evidence of over 16 vent holes cut to spread the fire.

VERTICAL VENTILATION STANDARD OPERATING GUIDELINES

• "Place 2 ladders to different corners."

• Only one ladder was used most of the fire.

SLOCF - E.O. 708.00

APPARATUS PLACEMENT AT STRUCTURE FIRES

COMMAND VEHICLE PLACEMENT

• "Spot the command vehicle in a manner that will allow maximum visibility of the fire building and surrounding area and the general effect of the companies operating on the fire."

• This was not done – BC-1 Berryman could not see the fire. His only visibility was the firewall separating 303 and 307 Higuera Street, where we think he planned to burn the fire to. We think, by choosing this location, Berryman was at the point he PLANNED to burn the structure to. He went directly there as soon as he arrived. He seemed to have stationed ladder truck T-1 there before he arrived. He could not see the fire at all from this position until around 2:00pm, when it had finally burned to his location!

SLOCF - E.O. 711.00

PROPERTY CONSERVATION

INTENT

"The activities that relate to effective property conservation require the same early and on-going command functions and aggressive action as both Rescue and Fire Control. Effective property conservation can greatly enhance our "customer service" and make life after the fire much better for the occupants. All San Luis Obispo City Fire Department members are expected to perform in a manner that continually reduces LOSS during fire operations, and that assists the customer during this traumatic event."

• All of SLO City FD leadership active at fires intentionally do the opposite of this goal.

• We can find no part of E.O. 711.00 that BC-1 Berryman or Fire Chief Olson took into account or even seemed to be aware of.

• BC-1 Berryman would not allow the owners to remove their valuables in the two hours before the fire was brought into Square Deal. A Fire Chief who has been in the community for barely four years does not flinch at totally destroying two local businesses that have been in the community over 44 years.

• BC-1 Berryman stated, "We will take NO RISK TO SAVE YOUR PROPERTY," (meaning he has declared a defensive or a burndown strategy upon arrival) – He states this to the business owner less than 15 minutes after the fire started. To make such a statement at this point of the fire is little different than to say, "We are going to burn down everything and there is nothing you can do about it."

• No water was put on any fire until most everything was well burned. If a total loss was SLO City FD leadership's goal, they succeeded.

• Neither Chief Olson nor BC-1 Berryman feels that E.O. 711.00 applies to them or the community they are supposed to serve.

• SLOCFD's tactics for fire actually is they intentionally maximize loss!

• SLOCFD not only will not help the customer/victim, they will not talk to them unless they idolize the FD and what happened.

We are sure there are many other parts of the San Luis Obispo City Fire – Emergency Operations Manual that BC-1 Berryman ignored.

BC-1 Berryman also totally ignores the I.A.F.C. (International Association of Fire Chiefs) "10 Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting" that generally guide Fire Department actions.

Leadership including BC-1 Berryman's must be replaced for San Luis Obispo to have an actual competent Fire Department.