The Sub Burndown

Saturday December 26, 2015



Section 1
- The Sub Fire -


6 Minutes With The Arsonist
Incendiary #1 — The timeline of initial events that sparked suspicion of arson.
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Fire Investigation Never Done
Cover-up of The Sub Fire started two days later…
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SLO City FD Failure to Evacuate
Clearing the building and ensuring nobody is inside - a crucial step neglected by the SLO City FD.
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No R.I.T. or F.A.S.T Crew Assigned
BC-1 Berryman not only did not assign a R.I.T./F.A.S.T. crew, he put his command post where the fire did eventually burn to…
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The Sub Fire Load & Interior Details
Store inventory and layout tells a different tale...
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Sub Roof Details
The Sub and SDRS had a complete recent earthquake upgrade...to achieve a one-hour Class A roof fire rating.
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Seven Paths To Enter & Fight The Fire At The Sub
The Sub was unique in how many ways it would have been easy to fight a fire.
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Burning A Building Down Is Not Firefighting
You can't put a structure fire out with chainsaws.
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Unknown Incendiary Device #2
Our assertion is that all evidence points to UID #2, having been ignited on top of The Sub.
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See How the Fire Moved Through the Structures

Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative Supplement of San Luis Obispo City Fire Department Captain Michael King

Michael King’s narrative was not written until eight days after the fire, we feel, in order to improperly coordinate his story.

Michael King's narrative was not written until eight days after the fire, we feel, in order to improperly coordinate his story.

It was not written independently and immediately after the fire which is SLO City FD policy.

King starts by stating The Sub building was "well involved" in smoke and fire, when he is describing a fire that is only burning in The Sub's front window box and not significantly in the structure at all. He states it burned at the A/D corner - It was the A/B corner.

King states initial lines were having no effect, yet the videos show a 3-second attack easily putting out all visible fire in the window box [see video: fire being put out]. No further narrative as to the fate of the fire in the window box, as if this is not what the narrative and fire scene is primarily about. It seems Michael King is stating E-2 was reassigned (in the middle of attempting to put out the primary fire?) to other far less important duties, and that the narrative of the first critical moments of the fire is not important except to bolster statements by other firefighters.

The fire does not enter the room behind the window box until at least an hour later when the roof collapses into the room. There is no fire in the room behind the window box when the fire is first put out - only burning above the window box.

King states Division B remains inside of Square Deal with a 1-3/4" hose. True - A hose went in the front door but only during softening of the structure at the beginning and was removed before the fire ever was in Square Deal. It never was used to put water on the fire.

King's narrative then jumps forward about two hours to 303 Higuera Street and the removal of servers. He then describes going into 303 Higuera Street (Square Deal) with no mention of the two hour jump forward in time. He does not mention that the first 32' he went into is routine office space with no significant fire load. He only describes the middle 32' section which he did not go into, and describes it like it was everywhere in Square Deal - and describes it incorrectly but uses the same copy as in the other narratives.





Section 2
- Square Deal Recordings & Supplies (SDRS) Fire -


The Sub Office Fire Proves Fire Did Not Come into Front of SDRS from The Sub through the Firewall Between the Two Businesses

The Sub/ SDRS Corp.© stands to prove the fire did not come into front of SDRS through the firewall of The Sub
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Unknown Incendiary Device #3 in SDRS

How did the fire go from The Sub to the front of Square Deal Recordings & Supplies when the fire was out in the portion of The Sub adjoining the front of Square Deal before the fire started in the front of Square Deal?
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SDRS Fire Load Notes

The SLO City FD leadership has repeatedly stated we had a huge fire load at Square Deal Recordings & Supplies. This is relatively untrue and totally untrue from the perspective of the two hours they had to stop the fire that was not yet in our building or prevent it from entering Square Deal.
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11 Basic Stop Points for Preventing Fire Spread into SDRS from Rear

11 basic stop points for preventing fire spread into Square Deal Recordings & Supplies from the rear (Pismo Street)
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Hole Map Illustration

Holes cut by members of SLO City FD and incendiary devices placed by unknown person(s)
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Section 3
- San Luis Obispo City Fire Department (SLO City FD) Issues -


SLOCF Fire Calls 2009-2016
History of success rate in San Luis Obispo fires.
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SLOCF Press Release Corrections
These are what we believe to be factual corrections to SLOCF Chief Garret Olson's press release…
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Bravest Act or a Cowardly, Evil Act?
Cutting holes in roofs is something firemen do but most civilians can't tell...
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Is BC-1 Berryman an Arsonist?
In evaluating the actions of Berryman, we have come to the following realizations...
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Total Destruction is a Job Well Done
Total destruction considered a job well done because no fireman was injured.
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SLOCF Fails to Follow Own Rules
We will state the appropriate rule from the current SLOCF manual and then what SLOCF actually did.
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SLOCF Underground "Burndown" Policy
SLOCF leadership seems to have an underground policy of refusing to go into buildings that are on fire.
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Is SLOCF Corrupt?
While none of these indicators singularly means corruption, a Fire Department guilty of most of these practices is certainly suspect, if not corrupt.
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How Can You Believe…?
Fire departments who fight few fires do not easily gain experience... There are three ways to deal with this…
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King states the main floor he was in had heavy fire loading, which is totally NOT TRUE. The front main floor is all desks, work counters, and routine office space. All these items remained after the fire - ruined but not burned. There was almost no unusual fire load and certainly nothing that would not be in any office.

King speaks of the multiple trips to get the servers. This is true and we are very thankful for these actions. However, if we were not forcibly barred from our own building for over two hours when no fire was present, we (or the firefighters) could have removed them and lots of other valuables!

King does not mention that before he is removing servers, other firefighters had already cut a 2-foot by 6-foot and a 4-foot by 4-foot hole in the roof over the corner of Square Deal as far away as possible from where the fire is actually burning. They cut one hole on each side of the middle Square Deal interior firewall [see photo: cutting two holes].

They cut a hole above area of The Sub office and three more holes on the east side of Square Deal 8'x8' main roof [see photo: fire coming through holes]. A total of at least eight draft holes in Square Deal roof with no interior attack planned or allowed.

We feel, the intention is to suck the fire forward into Square Deal. However, the wind direction is (almost always) wrong and the holes act as intake rather than exhaust. Smoke and fire do not initially come from the opening as planned.

Somehow, as if by magic, the fire at the far rear of Square Deal jumped from the back of Square Deal, skipped the middle of Square Deal, and came rapidly forward (against the wind) going through a complete floor-to-ceiling 20-minute firewall located 64' from the front and 16' from the rear of building (36' from the rear of the main dock). It then blew up out of the front roof drafting holes the firefighters just cut, initially showing roiling, black gasoline-like clouds going over 30 feet into the air [see photos: front going up].

There are three burn patterns in the front of Square Deal (touching The Sub office) that appear to be the result of an incendiary being added and lit to start the fire in the front of Square Deal [see photos: 1, 2, 3 burn patterns].

This explains how a fire at the rear jumps forward 80' through a 20-minute firewall in just a few minutes. It could also explain the missing 2-gallon gas can that was on the flammable cabinet at the beginning but was gone at the end of the fire. (The full 5-gallon gas can was still there - we used it to fuel the forklift after the fire.) It also explains why suddenly there was black, roiling smoke coming out the front of Square Deal (against the wind) just after our servers are miraculously saved - what timing….

The Sub office was not involved in either The Sub or Square Deal fire! Yet, firefighters' narratives imply the fire came through the firewall and The Sub office to get to the front of Square Deal.

King goes on to claim that water squirted through windows, against an interior wall, somehow fights a roof fire [see video: spray on 303 Higuera Street exterior].

King also fails to mention that AFTER the fire (that magically EXPLODED in big, black petroleum-looking flames through the holes SLO City FD cut in the roof), they then drove overhead hoses through these ventilation openings to add air to better spread the fire along the roof. They still had to spend HOURS burning the building from the front area back to the rear portion already burning. Even stranger is the firewall in the middle of the building (that did not stop the fire from magically coming forward) took SLO City FD some time and effort to burn through when they burned the main building from front to rear. The Tribune overhead drone photos show the fire stalled at the firewall in the middle and SLO City FD's use of water from hoses to fan the fire rather than quench it [see video: Tribune drone].

Firefighter Rules And Guidelines

The basis for the comments in this writing is taken from Firefighter's Rules of Engagement, the San Francisco Fire Department Ventilation Manual, and San Luis Obispo City Fire Emergency Operations Manual. These are standards that SLO City FD supposedly uses.

Below is copy of the original narrative statements given by the San Luis Obispo City Fire Department Captain Michael King regarding the fires at both the The Sub and Square Deal Recordings and Supplies, which took place on December 26, 2015 in downtown San Luis Obispo, California.

To download/save/print, please click here.



Section 4
- Comments, Observations and Correction on Narratives by SLO City FD -


Preamble to Narratives
The overall situation with the SLOCF narratives is that they seem to be an attempt to cover up gross negligence, professional malfeasance, and cowardice…
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SLOCF Battalion Chief-A Neal Berryman
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Battalion Chief-A Neal Berryman
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SLOCF Deputy Chief Jeff Gater
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Deputy Chief Jeff Gater
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SLOCF Chief Garret Olson
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Chief Garret Olson
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SLOCF Captain Michael King
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain Michael King
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SLOCF Captain Mark Vasquez
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain Mark Vasquez
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SLOCF Captain Matt Callahan
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain Matt Callahan
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SLOCF Captain-Paramedic Station 3A David Marshall
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain-Paramedic Station 3A David Marshall
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