First, note his report was not written until January 6^th, over ten days after the fire.

It was not written immediately after the fire which is SLO City FD policy.

Marshall claims that when he opened the rear door, and sliding door at 100 Pismo Street, thick black smoke came out. This was not when he opened the sliding door. If it were true, SLO City FD would not have taken the time to remove the two fixtures from the beaded curtain room [see photo: removed merchandise]. Before the fixtures were taken away, BC-1 Berryman had already declared it defensive and they were not allowed to go in. Neither pictures, nor evidence, physically support the claim of thick black smoke [see video: 100 Pismo Street doors/no black smoke]. It was not true for most of the remainder of the fire. The "thick black smoke" statement is an intentional "distortion" told to help excuse not actually fighting the fire. At one point early in the fire, a fireman goes into the beaded curtain room without bothering to put his mask on - certainly not a thick, black smoke scenario [see video: fireman going in].

By forcing these doors open before anyone even thought of an actual ventilation plan, the active unburned parts of the fire were sucked further into the store. To the right of The Sub's front door, sap on the post and some merchandise caught fire. If the doors had stayed closed until the hose teams in front or rear were ready to put out the fire above the window box, it is likely no fire would have gotten into the main room and no merchandise would have been burning.

Marshall actually claims they put a 2-1/2" fire hose through the rear door at 100 Pismo Street, (it looks like a 1-3/4" hose), but then claims that there was a partial collapse of the ceiling at the rear of the building (which was not yet on fire and would have zero chance of naturally collapsing) [see video/photo: rear area/no efforts being made]. No fire hose ever went in through the door and the ceiling could not yet be collapsed or collapsing unless it was collapsed by the actions of the roof crew (chainsaws) and the master streams (4" of water) driving down through the holes. This portion of the structure did not catch fire for more than 90 minutes after Marshall's statement. This portion of The Sub is the furthest point in the main building from the start of the fire.

If the loft over the rear door was partially collapsed early in the fire, it was by a combination of poorly considered roof cuts and master streams through the openings that were cut. If a stream came down on top of the loft, it could have partially collapsed one corner to a height of 6+ feet. Still ample space to go in, and not caused by fire, but by firemen and fire water streams.

Even though it was untrue that they weren't able to go into The Sub's 100 Pismo Street exit door, the sliding door right next to it was also an entry point into a room on the other side of a firewall. This room had an 8' wide by 7' tall portal into the main room that could have easily been used for entry and for safe firefighting, without entering the main room. If the loft was partially fallen, it would not have blocked this opening.

An interior attack could have also been conducted by going into the cut open doors in 283 Higuera Street (blacklight room) and water could have been put on any part of The Sub's main interior through the 36" wide doorway behind a 13" masonry firewall - a totally safe location to put water onto the fire from.

The statement about the partial ceiling collapse, (we had no ceilings only undersides of roofs), is at least different than the lie Chief Olson told owner, Richard Ferris, at the scene. Olson claimed the water on the roof caused the walls to shift and he was afraid to get near. Ferris explained to Chief Olson that they had just completed a full earthquake retrofit upgrade and the roof and walls were totally sound. With the walls soundly standing after the fire, we are not surprised that Marshall was drafted late in the game to fill in some narrative to try and make the unreasonable seem reasonable.