The Sub Burndown

Saturday December 26, 2015



Section 1
- The Sub Fire -


6 Minutes With The Arsonist
Incendiary #1 — The timeline of initial events that sparked suspicion of arson.
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Fire Investigation Never Done
Cover-up of The Sub Fire started two days later…
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SLO City FD Failure to Evacuate
Clearing the building and ensuring nobody is inside - a crucial step neglected by the SLO City FD.
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No R.I.T. or F.A.S.T Crew Assigned
BC-1 Berryman not only did not assign a R.I.T./F.A.S.T. crew, he put his command post where the fire did eventually burn to…
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The Sub Fire Load & Interior Details
Store inventory and layout tells a different tale...
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Sub Roof Details
The Sub and SDRS had a complete recent earthquake upgrade...to achieve a one-hour Class A roof fire rating.
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Seven Paths To Enter & Fight The Fire At The Sub
The Sub was unique in how many ways it would have been easy to fight a fire.
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Burning A Building Down Is Not Firefighting
You can't put a structure fire out with chainsaws.
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Unknown Incendiary Device #2
Our assertion is that all evidence points to UID #2, having been ignited on top of The Sub.
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See How the Fire Moved Through the Structures

Unidentified Incendiary Device (UID) #2 On Top Of The Sub Roof

Play segment from documentary above

It is our assertion that all evidence point to Unidentified Incendiary Device (UID) #2, in fact, was an incendiary device ignited on top of The Sub roof. No actual facts or reasoned deductions support a theory that it is the fire having burned through the roof!

Giving the benefit of doubt to firefighters is reasonable but in the case of UID #2, these available facts should leave no room for doubt.

    TIMELINE

  • 10:46am - Fire starts.
  • ≅10:50am - Voluminous white smoke and hot gases vent from open roof louver [see video].
  • ≅10:57am - Three firemen on roof witness the first fire coming from open louver at end of The Sub front peaked roof [see video]. It has taken 11 minutes for the fire to reach the open venting louver.
  • ≅10:58am - UID #2 goes off on The Sub roof – This is only one minute after the fire has just reached and is seen coming from the open louver at the front roof peak [see video]. It is less than 45 seconds after the firemen leave the area.
  • 11:02am - UID #2 is washed down the scupper and is gone – It appears and grows to full- size in 60 seconds. It is washed down the scupper after only four minutes of burning. It takes only five seconds of water to wash it away [see video sequence].
  • Front louver continues to vent both smoke and flame as before [see video].
  • No part of the roof is burned through yet as evidenced by the lack of fire or smoke from the former location of UID #2 [see video].
  • ≅11:15am - SLO City FD leadership has ladder truck T-1 direct its overhead stream into the louver that was venting smoke and fire from the initial incendiary [see video]. This pushes the fire back into The Sub and spreads it across the roof.
  • ≅12:30pm - The Sub roof finally burns through.
  • It took over 90 minutes for The Sub's front peaked roof to burn through. This is true even though it is above the primary fire, above both the initial UID in the front window box, and over the entire path the fire would follow from the original location towards the open louver at the end of the peaked roof that is venting the fire.
  • The flat portion of the roof where UID #2 went off is past the peaked roof with the open louver that is venting the fire. This end of the flat roof contains the drain scupper and is beyond (and is over 5' lower than) the peaked roof portion venting the fire.
  • The flat portion that the UID #2 went off on top of is in the very corner of the roof. The fire could not have been drawn to this “dead” corner past the venting louver at the end of the roof peak with any speed or force – It would have had to burn against the draft created by the open louver that was venting the fire. This would have taken considerable time
  • We feel these facts and deductions firmly show that UID #2 was on top of the roof and most likely an accelerant.

Section 2
- Square Deal Recordings & Supplies (SDRS) Fire -


The Sub Office Fire Proves Fire Did Not Come into Front of SDRS from The Sub through the Firewall Between the Two Businesses

The Sub/ SDRS Corp.© stands to prove the fire did not come into front of SDRS through the firewall of The Sub
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Unknown Incendiary Device #3 in SDRS

How did the fire go from The Sub to the front of Square Deal Recordings & Supplies when the fire was out in the portion of The Sub adjoining the front of Square Deal before the fire started in the front of Square Deal?
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SDRS Fire Load Notes

The SLO City FD leadership has repeatedly stated we had a huge fire load at Square Deal Recordings & Supplies. This is relatively untrue and totally untrue from the perspective of the two hours they had to stop the fire that was not yet in our building or prevent it from entering Square Deal.
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11 Basic Stop Points for Preventing Fire Spread into SDRS from Rear

11 basic stop points for preventing fire spread into Square Deal Recordings & Supplies from the rear (Pismo Street)
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Hole Map Illustration

Holes cut by members of SLO City FD and incendiary devices placed by unknown person(s)
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Section 3
- San Luis Obispo City Fire Department (SLO City FD) Issues -


SLOCF Fire Calls 2009-2016
History of success rate in San Luis Obispo fires.
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SLOCF Press Release Corrections
These are what we believe to be factual corrections to SLOCF Chief Garret Olson's press release…
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Bravest Act or a Cowardly, Evil Act?
Cutting holes in roofs is something firemen do but most civilians can't tell...
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Is BC-1 Berryman an Arsonist?
In evaluating the actions of Berryman, we have come to the following realizations...
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Total Destruction is a Job Well Done
Total destruction considered a job well done because no fireman was injured.
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SLOCF Fails to Follow Own Rules
We will state the appropriate rule from the current SLOCF manual and then what SLOCF actually did.
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SLOCF Underground "Burndown" Policy
SLOCF leadership seems to have an underground policy of refusing to go into buildings that are on fire.
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Is SLOCF Corrupt?
While none of these indicators singularly means corruption, a Fire Department guilty of most of these practices is certainly suspect, if not corrupt.
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How Can You Believe…?
Fire departments who fight few fires do not easily gain experience... There are three ways to deal with this…
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Above: Remains of roof in corner where UID #2 went off —
1. Most of flat roof is still unburned and in debris pile.

2. UID #2 burning on top of roof has turned the TPO roofing silver gray — only where UID 2 burned was the white TPO roofing turned silver gray which is consistent with an accelerant fire on top of the roof.

3. Plywood on burned back wall is burned and missing ONLY in location where we feel accelerant was poured onto roof.



VIDEO EVIDENCE

  • Videos clearly show fire and white smoke is venting from the two open roof louvers just before UID #2 goes off [see video].
  • UID #2 appears in the front corner (Side A/B of The Sub) on the flat portion of the roof. It goes from zero to full-blown in 60 seconds.
  • UID #2 shows temperatures in videos that could only be achieved with an accelerant and would not be achieved if it was a fire projecting through the roof burning the wood, paper, and merchandise below [see video].
  • The smoke venting from the actual fire just before UID #2 goes off is white and voluminous from the vent.
  • The smoke from UID #2 is black, roiling, and sooty looking – like an accelerant.
  • The parapet wall around the flat portion of The Sub's front roof is over 4' tall. So, when water is put over the parapet wall, it completely goes over the top of the fire (whether it is burning on top of or through the roof) and only has effect when it rolls back towards the roof drainage scupper. UID #2 on top of the roof is washed down the scupper drain in five seconds [see photo: The Sub roof structure] / see video: UID #2 washed down scupper].
  • If the fire had burned through the roof, the water would not have washed the fire away – It would have fallen through the hole. This would not put out a large merchandise fire if it was burning underneath and it would have had no effect on a fire burning on the underside of the flat roof.
  • Videos after UID #2 is out, show the fire returns to venting out the two roof louvers (and now the cut open roof hatch) and there is no sign of fire, smoke, or venting from the area UID #2 went off on top of [see video]. The Sub front peaked roof does not burn through for over an hour.
  • When ladder truck T-1 started putting water into the open end roof louver that was venting the fire, a different hose was also pushing water and air in the front door. This created a positive pressure in The Sub and caused smoke to be pushed out from multiple openings in the front of The Sub, but no smoke or fire came from the former location of UID #2 – So, no hole could be in the roof or smoke would have been forced out. This means that UID #2 had to be on top of the roof not burning through [see video].

Above: Remainder of flat roof never burned through in 2 hours, yet we are to believe the section under UID #2 burned through in 14 minutes.




    PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

  • Thermoplastic polyolefin (TPO) roofing does not melt until 1200°F. This means that non aerated wood will completely burn from underneath but, unless there is ventilation and air added to raise the temperature of the fire above 1200° F, it will not burn through the TPO roof membrane. Its normal failure mode is to tear when the roof structure collapses below it – This takes time!
  • The fire took almost 12 minutes to burn across the roof to finally show venting out of the end of roof louver [see video]. (Sixteen minutes into the fire – but during the first four minutes, the fire was likely confined to the window box.) Since it took almost 12 minutes to burn unimpeded from the original seat of the fire to the vent, it would be impossible for it to have burned 8' or 10' past the vent on a lower portion of the roof (against the air flow going out the louver) then burn through ¾ 1x8, ½" plywood, 3/8" fireboard, and then through the TPO roofing in roughly the same time it took to just burn to the opening venting the fire at the end of the roof peak.
  • TPO roofing discolors and turns a silver/gray when it has an immediate fire burning on top of it
  • The TPO roofing left after the fire in the location of UID #2 was turned silver/gray. All other TPO roofing remained white after the fire [see TPO report and photos].
  • In the photos of the debris where UID #2 went off, a large section of the original flat roof in the general area of UID #2 is seen in the debris pile fairly intact [see photo].
  • The rest of the flat roof away from the front of The Sub remained after the fire. The view from underneath shows that with all the time the fire burned in The Sub, it did not burn through the flat roof. Two hours of fire does not burn 2/3 of the flat roof that remains so it would not be possible to burn through the flat roof under UID #2 in just the couple of minutes it would have had [see photo: roof section].

Above: Floor under where UID #2 went off showing almost no signs of fire.




Above: It would (and does in The Sub fire) take over an hour to burn through this type of roof located in a "dead" corner of the fire.

Actually, the fire NEVER does burn through the flat section of The Sub roof. When the front peaked roof fails around 12:30, it pulls the flat roof from the wall and leave it in the debris pile unburned.


Section 4
- Comments, Observations and Correction on Narratives by SLO City FD -


Preamble to Narratives
The overall situation with the SLOCF narratives is that they seem to be an attempt to cover up gross negligence, professional malfeasance, and cowardice…
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SLOCF Battalion Chief-A Neal Berryman
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Battalion Chief-A Neal Berryman
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SLOCF Deputy Chief Jeff Gater
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Deputy Chief Jeff Gater
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SLOCF Chief Garret Olson
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Chief Garret Olson
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SLOCF Captain Michael King
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain Michael King
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SLOCF Captain Mark Vasquez
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain Mark Vasquez
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SLOCF Captain Matt Callahan
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain Matt Callahan
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SLOCF Captain-Paramedic Station 3A David Marshall
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain-Paramedic Station 3A David Marshall
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